Triggers of the 20th century

The First and Second World Wars reshaped in the development of media, transforming it into a strategic instrument for influencing public consciousness. Authors Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin argue in War and Media, that WWI was the first “mediatized” conflict. Advances in printing, the telegraph, photography, and cinema allowed media to reach millions and shape a shared informational space.This meant that political and military leaders gradually came to recognize that the mobilization of the army and the economy was insufficient without the mobilization of public consciousness.

When silence became policy: the rise of wartime information control

During the First World War, censorship aimed to protect military secrets and sustain public morale. As historian Florian Keisinger notes, from August 1914 the belligerent states introduced strict restrictions, fearing that uncontrolled information could undermine both public opinion and military operations.

In France, wartime legislation effectively suspended press freedom, forcing journalists to depend on official government “communiqués” and barring correspondents from the front, conditions that gave rise to what journalist Thomas Ferenczi famously called the “patriotic lie”. Germany centralized media control through the War Press Office by 1915, Britain wielded sweeping authority over the press and telegraph under the DORA, and the United States established the Committee on Public Information alongside the Espionage Act of 1917.

As American politician, Harold Lasswell argues, “Governments learn to nullify rather than to conceal undesirable ideas.” This marked a move towards indirect forms of control, where meaning was shaped through under-emphasis, neutral headlines, selective omission, and the repetition of preferred narratives. As Lasswell observed, even at the height of censorship, space for alternative interpretations persisted. Daily News, The Manchester Guardian, and Labour Leader initially questioned the necessity of the war, yet their tone shifted within days under mounting political pressure. The development of the underground press in Belgium and trench newspapers along the French front lines was journalism's direct answer to wartime censorship and repression. “La Libre Belgique” circulated over 1.25 million copies through clandestine networks, functioning as a symbol of resistance. Meanwhile, trench newspapers typically printed in runs of up to 700 copies served as a horizontal channel of communication among soldiers, combining news, personal accounts, and humor to sustain morale under extreme conditions.

By the Second World War, censorship had become an instrument of total informational control, designed to suppress unwanted narratives and build the reality presented to the public. According to Dr. Henry Irving, in the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Information, created in September 1939, served as the central authority responsible for both the distribution and censorship of all war related news. Press censorship operated on a principle of self enforcement: newspapers received guidance on restricted topics and submitted relevant stories for review, with approved material returned bearing an official stamp. A chaotic attempt to impose retrospective censorship on reports about the British Expeditionary Force triggered police seizures of newspapers, roadblocks in Fleet Street, and stopped newspaper trains across the UK. By October 1939, censorship responsibilities were transferred to an independent Press and Censorship Bureau.

When information became strategy: the age of propaganda

In WWI propaganda became a state instrument, which contributed to the professionalization of journalism and the expansion of its formats. While censorship restricted information, propaganda surged to dominate the narrative.

British journalist Spencer Hughes argued that journalists, with their instinct for language and audience, understood that the public responds to stories rather than logic. This made them valuable to the state: their ability to translate political messages into compelling narratives pushed them from independent observers to active participants in wartime communication.

One of the clearest examples of organized wartime propaganda was the Committee on Public Information, headed by American journalist George Creel under President Woodrow Wilson. As Creel described in «How We Advertise America», its output was vast: a daily newspaper with a circulation of 100,000 copies, 30 pamphlets in multiple languages totaling 75 million copies, and targeted content for rural, religious, and women’s publications. The CPI shifted American public opinion from isolationism to patriotic support for the war, portraying Germany as a barbaric aggressor and unifying public sentiment behind Wilson’s key policies. Its network of “Four-Minute Men”delivered brief patriotic speeches in cinemas and public spaces, ensuring the message reached every corner of the country.

In 1923, the American Society of Newspaper Editors adopted the Canons of Journalism, establishing principles of truth, accuracy, impartiality, and responsibility to the public. So, the experience of wartime control led to the formation of professional norms that sought to preserve journalistic autonomy. Yet these professional commitments, forged in the aftermath of one war, would face their most severe test in the next.

Propaganda in Nazi Germany was a total, centralized system designed to mobilize the population, justify aggression, and construct the image of the enemy. Appointed Propaganda Minister in 1933, Goebbels operated on a principle: propaganda must be simple and repeat few ideas constantly until every member of society internalizes them. As Dr. Michael Stout notes, the ministry was divided into seven departments, one dedicated exclusively to journalism, with daily directives specifying which narratives to promote and which to suppress. Every information channel was placed under state control, from radio receivers distributed to every household to cinema and print. By 1944, the number of publications had fallen from 5,000 to fewer than 1,000. The profession was not suppressed, it was absorbed. This became most visible at Stalingrad in February 1943, when the ministry maintained silence for weeks before repackaging the surrender of 90,000 soldiers as heroic sacrifice. According to the Federal Ministry of Justice, Article 5 of the West German Basic Law of 1949 guaranteed press freedom, and the German Press Council, established in 1956, restored independent self regulation to the profession.

A new speed of war: how technology redefined information and influence

Technological breakthroughs of the early 20th century transformed both the scale of communication and the genres of journalism. The telegraph imposed strict limits on length and cost, giving rise to the inverted pyramid. Newspapers, leaflets, and pamphlets each adapted to different audiences: analysis for readers, short emotional messages, simplified persuasion for mass distribution. Radio reshaped the relationship between power and the public. During the Second World War, Churchill, Roosevelt, Hitler all used to speak directly to mass audiences, while the BBC combined news reporting with morale-building through tone, interviews, and music, demonstrating that format itself could carry meaning.
Visual media completed the transformation. Photography moved from illustration to evidence, the photojournalist became a recognized profession, and propaganda posters proved that an image “Your Courage, Your Cheerfulness, Your Resolution Will Bring us Victory" could inspire millions. Journalism has become multi-format. Despite intensified censorship and propagandistic control, the war did not merely constrain journalism, but paradoxically accelerated its development. Together, both wars revealed a fundamental truth: the same skills that make journalism powerful make it vulnerable to power.

The first Television War
The Cold War was not only a geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but also a significant moment for TV journalism. Television became a central medium through which ideological narratives were broadcast and public opinion was shaped.
The coverage of the Soviet-Afghan War functioned as a classic propaganda system, especially on television. One of the techniques which were implemented is framing the war. Official media described it as a “limited contingent”, not “a war” fulfilling an internationalist duty to assist a friendly government.
TV programs like “Vremya”, which was the main evening news, played a central role. TV reports were short, well-structured according to the narrative. Journalists did not operate independently; they followed party directives. Therefore, high trust was created due to limited access to information.
At the same time, the Vietnam War demonstrated television’s power to shape political and social movements, contributing to anti-war sentiment in the United States. Although, as an American sociologist Todd Gitlin notes, “movements and media are not creatures of each other; they work on each other”.
By 1959 the television had entered most American households, significantly increasing its influence on how audiences understood international events. The Vietnam War is often described as the «first television war», as reporting evolved from controlled narratives to more critical and visually direct coverage, exposing audiences to the realities of war.

Unlike previous conflicts such as World War II, where media content and journalistic material were heavily censored and strictly controlled, Vietnam War journalists operated within distinguished freedom. Channels such as CBS and NBC regularly aired footage filmed in combat zones, including scenes of destruction, wounded soldiers, and civilians suffering almost with no censorship.
This direct visual demonstration had a large psychological effect on audiences, making the realities of war more immediate and emotionally impactful than ever before. According to media scholar Daniel Hallin, this shift marked a new phase in war reporting, as television became central in shaping the political environment.
Another vital development was the role of television correspondents as influential public figures. Journalists and correspondents of famous TV programmes associated with reliable sources of information among the audience. Walter Cronkite, anchor of CBS Evening News, emerged as a trusted voice; his 1968 report after the Tet Offensive concluded that the war was likely unwinnable:
“It seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate.”
This statement significantly influenced public opinion and even political decision-making. U.S President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America”. This claim highlighted the growing power of television journalism.
The Vietnam War also marked the rise of investigative and critical reporting. Journalists increasingly questioned official narratives, particularly in coverage of events such as the My Lai Massacre. Investigative reporting during that period exposed atrocities committed by U.S military forces.
As media scholar Daniel Hallin mentioned:
“They continued to rely on these same sources throughout the war; but later on these sources became much more divided, and many more of them were critical or unenthusiastic about American policy.”

In terms of innovations, portable cameras and improved film processing enabled faster production and distribution of news footage, which was very crucial for the news agenda. Despite the fact that broadcasts were not fully live, reporters still could be transmitted relatively quickly, allowing networks to maintain a flow of information. This approach created a sense of immediacy that blurred the line between distant conflict and domestic experience.

24-hour news coverage
The Gulf War marked a decisive turning point in the evolution of TV journalism, particularly in terms of real-time reporting, global media reach, and connection between military and journalists.
One of the most noticeable developments during this war was the emergence of 24-hour news coverage, led by CNN Special Reports. It delivered continuous updates throughout Operation Desert Storm.

Unlike the Vietnam war, when reports were delayed due to processing and information transportation, CNN broadcasted instantly via satellite. The network’s continuous live reporting from Baghdad, led by Bernard Shaw, Peter Arnett, and John Holliman, created a sense of immediacy, which allowed viewers to witness the unveiling of military operations. For instance, they made live reports during the initial bombing on January 17, 1991, transmitted via satellite. It was the moment when audiences worldwide witnessed the war as it unfolded, establishing what later became known as “CNN Effect”.

However, the rise of live broadcasting also introduced ethical challenges, requiring careful editorial decisions to prevent harm and maintain public trust. As media scholar Pier Robinson noted, journalists took deliberate steps to ensure that families of those killed were informed through official channels before such information was broadcast, in order to avoid causing unnecessary distress.

The 20th century was defined by a limited number of television channels and editorial offices controlling information flows, the rise of satellite communication began to erode that control. Digital platforms accelerated the process further, making the production and dissemination of information faster and more decentralized. By the 2010s, social media had become one of the central sources of information, especially in the context of political and military crises.

Social media: the new battlefield

One of the major global political events of 2010-2012 was the Arab Spring. At the time, social media played an important role, directly influencing the revolutionary movements and protests that swept through the Middle East and North Africa. According to the Arab Social Media Report, over a period of about six months, usage of Facebook rose by 50%, influencing public opinion and mobilization. However, the platforms did not guarantee total freedom of information dissemination

It should be noted an important influence of Al Jazeera Media Network on the events of “Arab Spring”. Already in this period the channel functioned not only as a traditional television, but also a multimedia platform that actively integrates content from social networks. Particularly in Egypt, where reports from Tahrir Square have attacked worldwide attention and enhanced the role of social media in shaping public opinion. Accordingly, the development of the use of social media has accelerated the evolution of citizen journalism, gaining its role in shaping public perception of protests.

The war in Syria and citizen journalists

The Syrian Civil War is a good example of the growing role of citizen journalism.As international media faced significant restrictions in conflict zones, local residents became the main source of documentation by posting photos and videos on social media especially on YouTube, Facebook and X (Twitter).

One well-known example is the group "Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently", whose members recorded the crimes of terrorist organizations and published relevant materials in the public domain. Their activities were accompanied by serious threats: a number of activists were killed by ISIS, which highlights the high level of danger faced by citizen journalists in the context of armed conflict. Videos and photographs posted by eyewitnesses were quickly distributed via YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and other platforms. In conditions of limited access, it was user-generated content that largely shaped the perception of a foreign audience about the development of the conflict.

Russia and Ukraine Conflict

Social media has also become an important tool in the information war between Russia and Ukraine. From the first days of the full scale invasion, users posted videos of destruction and explosions, troop movements, which were actively used by OSINT journalists and analysts to monitor the situation on the ground. But it is important to note that the information war began long before that, in the 2010s. Russian media often spread false information to justify aggression and manipulate public opinion. 

A feature of this conflict is the widespread use of digital technologies to influence public opinion. An important role is played by so-called “bot farms”, networks of coordinated accounts that spread a specific agenda by participating in online discussions. Arman Shuraev, Kazakh journalist and media manager, notes, the scale of such activity can be significant:

“ We are talking about an abnormal number of such accounts. There may be hundreds or even thousands of them. Russian opposition journalists have declassified the Olga troll factory, which is now run by Konstantin Malafeev. He is still in charge of this area at the request of the Kremlin, having mastered not only Facebook, but also Twitter, Instagram and other platforms to conduct Russian narratives. This troll factory exists, and I think as long as the current regime exists, all these bots will be present”.

Telegram channels also have become an important element of the information field of Ukraine-Russian conflict. The so-called telegram channels of "military personnel" sources such as Rybar, WarGonzo, Ukraine NOW, Trukha Ukraine are forming alternative narratives that often go beyond journalistic standards and reduce critical audience perception. Under these circumstances, traditional media increasingly rely on Telegram as a source of intelligence, which increases the dilemma between spread and reliability and weakens editorial control.

Military conflicts have demonstrated that the media space has become an area for geopolitical confrontation. For many years, it was believed that the global agenda was created largely by Western media. Therefore, Russia has launched projects such as Russia Today (RT), showing an alternative interpretation of events.Media expert Yablokov noted that RT challenges an elitist aspect of American politics through populist ideas vocalized by experts and show hosts. Now this rhetoric is only getting stronger. The opposing powers reciprocally restrict official media content, while the Internet is filled with fakes and materials generated by artificial intelligence.

AI goes to war

As Jazeera Digital News Editor Faras Ghani highlights "Now, with social media, we no longer rely only on those individuals covering content for us. In the case of Gaza, for example, the news, the videos, the photos, the updates everything is projected on social media directly from the people affected. Before, it used to be a reporter talking to the people who were affected. Now it's the people themselves. They put their stories on Instagram, on X, on YouTube. So wars and conflicts are now presented in a more first-person way, you hear directly from people who are suffering, rather than through the filter of a journalist standing in front of a camera,"

According to researchers Amponsah and Atianashie, AI has influenced the media by automating routine tasks, yet its implementation brings serious difficulties: programmatic bias, unclear verdicts, and the spread of false information through synthetic material and deepfakes.

"If it's something tangible, an audio clip, a video, a social media post, we send it to our in-house verification unit. They run it through various tools: reverse image search, metadata analysis, cross-platform upload checks, audio synchronization checks, facial movement analysis for deepfakes. There's a Google fact-check tool, and we also work directly with platforms, TikTok, YouTube, Meta, who can tell us if a video was actually uploaded four years ago despite claiming to show a recent event," Faras shared.

Until recently, producing a convincing deepfake required significant technical resources. Today it can be done on a smartphone. Research by Soomro and colleagues shows that AI tools have been used in recent conflicts not only to spread false information, but to generate confusion and drain editorial attention. The first confirmed use of a deepfake in a major conflict came early in the Russia-Ukraine war, when fabricated footage appeared to show President Zelensky calling on his citizens to surrender. Its purpose was not primarily to deceive. It was to distract.

That same logic appears in AI targeting systems. Investigations by +972 Magazine revealed that the Israeli military used a system called Lavender, which processed around 37,000 potential targets at the start of the Gaza campaign, each in approximately 20 seconds. Events moving at algorithmic speed cannot be covered by a profession that operates on human timescales.

Philip Howard's concept of computational propaganda describes how platforms push ideologically driven content toward psychologically susceptible groups with material designed to produce fear or anger. No central coordination is required. The platform's own architecture handles distribution, prioritising whatever generates the strongest reaction regardless of accuracy. The "decapitated children" claim during the Gaza conflict illustrates this: an unverified report was amplified by high-profile accounts, pushed into trending topics by the algorithm, picked up by major outlets, and eventually repeated by President Biden at a White House event. The White House later acknowledged he had seen no independent confirmation. No single actor directed any of this. The volume of unverified material entering newsrooms has grown sharply, while the time to process it has shrunk. The pressure to publish first is built into the structure of the ecosystem.

The US-Israel-Iran war of 2026 made this clearer than ever: hundreds of posts featuring fabricated footage reached hundreds of millions of views. A video of rockets over Tel Aviv appeared in over 300 posts; a clip of the Burj Khalifa in flames was viewed tens of millions of times. Neither was real. In 2026, Dhayef and Smesim describe the April 2024 escalation as the "First AI War," documenting how both sides used recycled footage, fabricated claims, and emotionally charged visuals before any verification was possible. As Rupok notes, false claims about major events circulated faster than fact-checkers could respond, with creators monetising fabricated conflict footage through platform revenue-sharing programmes.

"From the fact that all these technologies are private and belong to private companies. When you see that something is genuinely dangerous putting individual security and the security of entire communities at risk the answer is: this cannot remain in private hands. It must be nationalized. It must be public, controlled by the state, financed with taxpayer money, with revenues returning to the public. We don't allow private armies when someone walks around with weapons outside state control, we call it a failed state. The army is controlled by the state because weapons are dangerous," noted Euronews journalist Sergio Cantone.

In August 2024, the European Union adopted Regulation (EU), the world's first comprehensive law regulating artificial intelligence. Companies using manipulative techniques face fines of up to 35 million euros. China went further: in January 2023, Beijing ordered platforms to label all synthetic content and banned deepfakes without the subject's consent. The logic behind both approaches is the same: AI is no longer a private business matter. It is infrastructure, and it requires public oversight.

"The internet and artificial intelligence have reached the level of danger of a nuclear weapon. So I'm sorry to those who believe in total economic freedom and treat the free market as a religion. They must accept that this level of importance and danger is a threat to everyone, and therefore it must be controlled by the state," said Sergio.

Where once the outcome of conflict was determined by the size of armies and the force of weapons, it is now increasingly decided by technological superiority in the information space. Those who control the narrative, the platforms, the algorithms, the ideologists and journalists who shape global perception, hold a power that no military advantage alone can match. What distinguishes the current moment is the simultaneous military, political and technological pressure at the same time. Journalism has survived each transformation by rebuilding its standards from within. The real question is whether the institutional will and professional commitment exist to ensure that what emerges on the other side is still recognizable as journalism.

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